Shtypi i huaj rreth Kosovës

[Arb]

Po hap kete teme, per te postuar reagime (te anetareve te FD), dhe te tjereve, drejtuar te gjithe atyre shkrimeve (te mediave te shkruara dhe elektronike) pro-Shkijeve qe javet e fundit (me nguti) po propagandojne kunder njohjes zyrtare te Pavaresise se Kosoves.











Kosovo deserves independence

As a regular Post reader, I was disappointed by Caroline B. Glick's recent column "Islam and the nation-state" (November 13). It promulgated numerous misconceptions about Kosovo and the Kosovo Albanians.
Glick writes: "Today the US and the EU are leading the charge toward the establishment of a Palestinian state and the creation of an independent state of Kosovo" - as if the two issues were related. There is no connection between being for the establishing of a state of Kosovo and the establishment of a Palestinian state. It is wrong to compare Kosovo with the Palestinian case simply because they have one thing in common - the Muslim religion. Analogy, goes the saying, is no substitute for analysis.

Israel opposes an imposed solution on Kosovo, but the Israeli government has given its full support to the Contact Group principles - one of them being the non-return of Kosovo to the situation before 1999. Kosovo is not a minority-dominated enclave within some other nation-state, as Glick claims. Serbia's power is not being eroded as there is no longer any Yugoslavia. Kosovo, under the UN's mandate since 1999, has already established its state institutions, independent of Serbia.
FOR READERS to better understand why Glick is mistaken in her analogy, it is necessary to know some basic truths about Kosovo: The area was annexed by Yugoslavia, against Kosovar resistance in 1918. This annexation violated the right of the Kosovars to self-determination and, therefore, violated international law.
Although Kosovo Albanians constitute 92% of the population of Kosovo, the autonomy it enjoyed was unconstitutionally removed by Serbia in 1989. After Tito's death in 1980, the situation deteriorated, reaching its nadir in the 1998 genocide.
It is precisely this genocide which explains the uniqueness of Kosovo case. For more than a century, genocide and mass expulsions of Kosovo Albanians transformed Kosovo into a unique case. Albanians suffered extreme repression under the Milosevic regime. Some 12,000 civilians were killed, and 1.5 million Albanian civilians were displaced as part of an ethnic cleansing campaign of the Serbian Army in 1999. Around 3,000 are still missing.
Serbia has lost all legal and moral claim over Kosovo. When a state so discriminates against a national group under its rule, the right of that group to self-determination includes the right to secession. This idea is internationally recognized. The right of Kosovo to self-determination is not restricted to the right of internal, substantial autonomy inside Serbia. It is a right to secede from Serbia, a right to independence, as envisaged by the Ahtisaari Package. Kosovars cannot be forced to go back under the sovereignty of Serbia.
I deliberately use the term "Kosovo Albanians" because "Kosovo Muslims," as Glick calls them, has an underlying propaganda purpose. Why doesn't she refer to "The Serbia Orthodox"?
LET'S BE clear: There is no Islamist trend in the Albanian cause. It is a fundamental mistake to equate Religion with ethnicity.
While referencing Milosevic, Glick writes: "He stood accused of ethnically cleansing Kosovo of its Muslim population, which was perceived as innocent." Thus the genocide against Kosovo Albanians - the most documented event of its kind since WWII - is, for Glick, just a perception. This is beyond belief.
Regarding her claim that "Kosovo Muslims" are financed by Saudis, and their alleged connections to "global jihadists," this is false. No one in the democratic West will swallow this distorted version of the reality in Kosovo.
"Jihadist" and "irredentist" are simply loaded Serbian code-words. Kosovo is strongly supported by Washington, London, Paris and Rome. As Albania's prime minister, Dr. Sali Berisha, has stated: "Kosovo and Kosovars have chosen Brussels."
It is no coincidence that Kosovo was liberated by NATO, a powerful and democratic structure of states with an overwhelming Christian population.
THERE IS social cohesion and religious harmony in Kosovo. Today, the Speaker of the House, Kolë Berisha, is a Catholic. There is also a Christian Democratic Party now in the forefront of the struggle for independence in Kosovo. Kosovo Albanians are more European than any other neighboring country in the Balkans. All surveys make clear that an overwhelming majority of the population supports NATO membership and EU integration.
Any discussion on the independent state of Kosovo should concentrate on the democratic nature of that state. Glick is mistaken when she urges the Olmert government to "immediately and loudly restate its opposition to the imposition of Kosovar independence on Serbia." Her logic of opposing the establishment of Muslim-only states should not apply in the case of Kosovo, because Kosovo is not and will not be a Muslim state.
Attempts to differentiate between the Albanians in Albania and the Albanians in Kosovo are wrong. There is, of course, sub-cultural diversity, as with all nations in the world, but Albanians on both sides of the border share the same culture, ethnicity, history, language, tradition, myths and legends.
The best answer, however, to all the speculations about Albania and the Albanians was given by your reporter Greer Fay Cashman in her Post report, "Sheltered from the Nazis in Albania" (November 4), which noted that Albania saved every one of its Jews during the Holocaust. And most of the Albanians who gave shelter to Jews during WWII were Muslims. Within the context of excellent relations existing between Albanians and Jews, there is no cause for inflammatory statements based on our religious heritage alone. The writer, a sociologist, is the new ambassador of the Republic of Albania to Israel.

[Arb]

Ja nje shkrim pro-Shkije i nje gazetari Britanik...

http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/st...214357,00.html

[Peja-Boy]

Putin njofton për kundërmasat ndaj zgjerimit të NATO-s


“Duke i shkelur marrëveshjet e arritura më parë, përgjatë kufirit tonë po rriten resurset ushtarake të shteteve të caktuara dhe vendeve anëtare të NATO-së, kurse propozimet ruse për, siç është rasti me krijimin e sistemit unik të mbrojtjes kundër-raketore me një qasje të barabartë në drejtimin e tyre të të gjithë pjesëmarrësve, tani për tani- për fat të keq- mbesin pa përgjigje”, ka thënë Putin, gjatë një takimi me kreun ushtarak rus.

Si një nga kundërmasat ruse ndaj NATO-së, Putin ka vënë moratoriumin për pjesëmarrjen e Rusisë në Marrëveshjen për Armatimin Konvencional në Evropë, suspendimi i së cilës nis, më 12 dhjetor, të këtij viti.

Putin ka thënë se Rusia do ta rris gjendjen e gatishmërisë luftarake të forcave të saj nukleare, “me qëllim që t’i jap përgjigje adekuate secilit agresor”.

[Arb]

Serbs can hurt independent Kosovo, not cripple it
By Ivana Sekularac and Fatos Bytyci

BELGRADE/PRISHTINA, Nov 28 (Reuters) - Serbia could apply hardball tactics if Kosova declares independence, making life harder, more expensive and frustrating for the landlocked province's 2 million people.

Talks between Belgrade and Kosova's ethnic Albanian majority ended in Austria on Wednesday with no agreement, and Serbia is drawing up an "action plan" for the period after Dec. 10, when mediators submit their conclusions to the United Nations.

Kosova Albanians say they will declare independence soon, probably in the next three months. U.S. envoy Frank Wisner urged both sides to keep their promise to avoid a slide to violence.

Serbian Defence Minister Dragan Sutanovac has repeatedly said there will be no military reaction. But Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica refuses to discuss other plans for what his deputy calls "the blackest scenario".

He will reject any declaration and, according to Serb media, may withdraw ambassadors from capitals that recognise Kosovo.

Serbia could refuse to recognise Kosovo passports, forcing travellers to make a big detour to get to Western Europe. It could cut off electricity supplies and block power supply routes. Kosovo buys 40 percent of its power from Serbia, the rest from Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania.

"Macedonia and Greece usually have power shortages so Kosovo gets electricity from Serbia or from Bulgaria -- but even then the transit route goes through Serbia," a Serb Energy Ministry official told Reuters.

But it would not make such a move lightly, mindful of its impact on Kosovo's Serb minority, marginalised and looking to Belgrade as the provider of basic services.

"If we cut off the power supply, we would be cutting it to the Serbs as well," the official said.

A source in one Serbian ministry said Serbia "could make life more difficult in Kosovo if it wanted".

"Goods from Serbia are the cheapest in Kosovo, so if Serbia for any reason blocks borders or stops supplying Kosovo it would make life in the province more expensive," the source said.

"Serbia wouldn't necessarily say it is closing the borders, but find a pretext, for example say Kosovo has foot and mouth."


EXAGGERATING POWER

But Kosovo officials say Serbia's moves are unlikely to have any long-term impact.

Reality reflects the eight years the province has spent out of Serbia's reach. Kosovo has been under U.N. rule since 1999, when NATO expelled Serb forces accused of killing civilians while fighting separatist rebels.

It has its own state administration -- part local, part U.N.-run -- and its citizens use midnight-blue "travel documents" issued by the U.N. mission, which are however not recognised by Serbia. Police, schools, and hospitals are all locally managed.

It has an independent water supply, gets mobile telephony services from Monaco, and routes commercial flights outside Serb airspace using NATO air control. Its only practical links with Serbia are in power, trade and road transport.

"If Serbia reacts, they won't only cause problems to Kosovo but Macedonia, Albania and Greece as well. Kosovo is a transit route for these countries," Nezir Sinani, spokesman for Kosovo's power company KEK.

Besim Beqaj from Kosovo's Chamber of Commerce says the Serbs are exaggerating their power. Imports and transit trade from Serbia account for around 15 percent of total trade, and most products come from the European Union and Macedonia.

"We've already thought of this and told our partners in the region what we import from Serbia. If Belgrade acts, they will bring the goods from other countries. There will be a momentary crisis but very soon everything will be normalised," he said. (Writing by Ellie Tzortzi)

[Arb]

Kosovo deserves its independence

I saw the terrible things the Serbians did; they proved themselves a cruel and unjust power

Anthony Loyd


Far beyond the borders of Serbia a sickening form of revisionism has prevailed across the years among critics of Kosovo's desire for independence. Some of it is born from a smug desire for controversy. Much of it comes from ignorance. A part of it derives from racism: inscrutable, impoverished, Muslim, their language and culture unlike any other in Europe, Kosovo Albanians are an easy “white nigger” target for the self-satisfied elements of Western Europe's pseudo-political classes.
The argument of the critics of Kosovan independence rests on two bogus tenets of denial. First, they state that Serbia was not responsible for the widescale massacre of Albanian civilians between 1998 and 1999, and propose instead that Serb security forces were somehow tricked into killing thousands of innocents by the provocation of the Kosovo Liberation Army. Secondly, they advance the theory that the 800,000 Albanian refugees who fled their homes during Nato's 79-day air campaign did so as they were frightened of the bombing rather than Serb military units.
Were these claims true then the fundamental case for Kosovo's independence, in the spotlight since the expiry on Monday of a UN deadline for Pristina and Belgrade to reach agreement on the province's future status, would be fatally flawed.
But they are untrue. I know this not as an assumption, but as a fact. I have many memories of Kosovo acquired during the time I spent reporting there between 1998 and 2000. Among the images of mass graves, burnt villages and swelling bodies that spring to mind is one of particular significance. In the fields outside the town of Istinic in southwestern Kosovo one summer day I watched some 40,000 Kosovans corralled together by rings of Serb police. The young, the old; man, woman, child, they stared in abject fear to the horizon where smoke from their villages, torched in a Serb purge from which they fled, gathered thickly in the skies. “Where is Europe? Where is America?” one refugee beseeched me.



After a day or two the Serb police pushed them back into the hinterland, driving them with stinging switches and robotic threats broadcast from tannoys mounted on the sides of armoured personnel carriers. These people had not fled from fear of Nato bombing.
The first Nato bomb was seven months away from falling. This was the summer of 1998. The world little cared for Kosovo then and in a dry run for their larger purge operations a year later the Serbs were already driving thousands of people from their homes.
The memory is pertinent to Kosovo's case for independence now as it revealed the absolute complicity of the Serbian authorities in human rights abuses in Kosovo and proved them then, as later, a cruel and unjust power from which the oppressed Kosovo Albanian majority thoroughly deserved to be independent.
The KLA were no angels. An everyman insurgent force (rather than a simple mafia entity as suggested by revisionists) comprising freedom fighters, intellectuals, peasants, nationalists, they also had a criminal element and their own human rights record was abysmal. But they reflected the majority population's desire for independence, a wish made credible, more than anything else, by the behaviour of the Serbian Government towards the civilian population.
As the international community wrings its hands over what to do with Kosovo now, it would do well to remember those facts. For time is no longer on anyone's side. Too much of it has already been wasted in vaccilation since 1999.
Earlier this year a resurgent Russia, keen to reinvigorate its influence on the region, torpedoed the UN's reasonable plan for supervised independence for Kosovo. A further five months of fruitless negotiation between Serbs and Kosovans followed before the December 10 deadline passed without result.
The current impasse seems solid. On one side Kosovo's newly elected Prime Minister, Hashim Thaci, a former KLA member, is readying himself for a unilateral declaration of independence, backed by the US, Britain, France and most of the EU.
On the other Serbia's nationalist Prime Minister, Vojislav Kostunica, backed by Russia, has made Kosovo's status as part of Serbia a lead issue in Serb politics and has given warning of dire consequences should the EU recognise Kosovan independence.
Doom merchants paint a grim picture in which Kosovo declares independence only to have it challenged by Serbia as being illegal without the imprimatur of the UN Security Council, in turn blocked by Russia. Violence subsequently flares in the province, then across the Balkans as Serbs in Bosnia and Albanians in Macedonia also demand independence. Presto: a new Balkan war made worse by a new cold war.
But the realities suggest otherwise. Mr Thaci knows he needs international recognition for independence and has already said that a declaration will be made in collaboration with the EU and US. He understands that a rash unilateral declaration would only deepen the economic malaise of a province totally reliant on outside financial assistance for survival.
Furthermore, for all the Kostunica hype in Serbia, most Serbs are far more concerned with their own economic woes than Kosovo's status, and may be reluctant to seek Russian patronage if it means worsening relations with the EU. Having fought and lost four wars in 16 years they are in no particular hurry for another conflict, and despite the sabre-rattling there has been no mobilisation of Yugoslav army units.
In Kosovo itself, due to the absence of any reconciliation between the two ethnic groups since 1999, the minority Serb population exists in enclaves largely removed from the Albanians. Low-level civil unrest, rioting and murder are possibilities, but with 16,000 Nato troops in the province it is unlikely that there can be any widescale clash of opposing paramilitaries.
So the road ahead may not be as perilous as it is feared. Wriggle room exists. However, in the meantime the EU should bolster its civilian and military missions in Kosovo, ensuring that the Serb minority is well protected. Though it would be ideal if a way forward could be found with Russian and Serb agreement, the EU should also accept that this is now unlikely to happen.
And when considering how to respond to the inevitable declaration of independence, the EU should also divest itself as best possible from the emotive language of regional players and revisionists alike and remember three simple facts. The Serbs effectively and irreversibly lost control of Kosovo in 1999. The majority of Kosovans want independence. And, above all, they deserve independence.

[Guri i madh]

Postimi origjinal është bërë nga Arb

Ja nje shkrim pro-Shkije i nje gazetari Britanik...

http://www.guardian.co.uk/comment/st...214357,00.html

arb klikova në ket link po asgjë nuk morra vesh pos do jastaka me lpendra te gusave qata i qkyva

[Amina]

We deserve dhe Independence but they are making it very hard for us!
It is not fair!

[Arb]

Kosovo Struggles to Forge an Identity
PRISTINA, Kosovo — When Kosovo recently held a contest to design a flag, the organizers insisted that it reflect the multiethnic population, shunning the nationalist symbols of the past.
But dozens of artists ignored that edict. They submitted variants of the red and black Albanian flag, its two-headed eagle proudly displayed at weddings and on the battlefield for decades. The flag is reviled by many Serbs, who make up a minority in this breakaway Serbian province.
As Kosovo prepares to declare independence — the culmination of a long and bloody struggle — this artistic rebellion underlines the challenge this small territory faces to forge a secular national identity, one that can overcome ethnic and religious resentments.
Hashim Thaci, the incoming Kosovo prime minister who was the leader of the rebel Kosovo Liberation Army, expressed the view of many Kosovars when he recently said, “A Kosovo identity does not exist.” But that is starting to change.
“How we create a Kosovar identity is a critical question,” said Migjen Kelmendi, a former rock star who is now a linguist and editor. Mr. Kelmendi is leading the effort to fashion a new self-image for Kosovo. The Albanian Muslims who form a large majority of Kosovo, he said, “think of themselves in terms of their Albanian ethnicity, and they think that questioning that makes them a traitor.”
An important date for Kosovo passed on Dec. 10, the deadline for negotiations to end on the province’s status. Mediators from the European Union, Moscow and Washington reported to the United Nations that the negotiations had failed. Expectations are that in due time, Kosovo will simply declare independence.
In anticipation, symbols have been cropping up. Fighters of the Kosovo Liberation Army have peppered the province with giant monuments and statues glorifying K.L.A. soldiers and guerrillas, idealized fighters resembling James Dean, who wield AK-47 assault rifles and stare down at passers-by on Pristina’s main boulevards. The United States is similarly glorified, with a statue of Bill Clinton in the works and a replica of the Statue of Liberty atop the Victory Hotel.
Intellectuals and political analysts argue that this rebranding of Kosovo inevitably trips over history. Albin Kurti, an ethnic Albanian activist who is under house arrest, contends that Kosovar Albanians are wedded to their Albanian identity because they have long defined themselves by the ethnicity for which they were persecuted during decades of authoritarian regimes.
“Our nationalism is a reaction to oppression by Milosevic and war with the Serbs,” Mr. Kurti said, referring to Slobodan Milosevic, former president of Yugoslavia, who in 1989 ended Kosovo’s autonomous status and dismissed 130,000 ethnic Albanians from their jobs. The subsequent repression of the Kosovo Albanians eventually brought Western sanctions on the Milosevic government and an American-led NATO bombing campaign.
The attempt to forge a new identity also resurrects memories of the Communist period after World War II when Tito tried to stifle ethnic Albanian identity as part of his project to subsume ethnic divisions across Yugoslavia. Instead, Tito’s effort had the opposite effect. He also inadvertently fostered a movement among Kosovar Albanians for the reunification of Kosovo with neighboring Albania — an aim since abandoned in favor of independence from Serbia.
Yet a new identity is needed if Kosovo is to provide for a multiethnic state with a segregated Serbian minority and reduce the divisions that have often led to war, a variety of leaders say.
Agim Ceku, Kosovo’s outgoing prime minister, argued in an interview that Kosovo must create a secular nation and draft a constitution like America’s that recognizes the rights of all citizens. Shortly after becoming prime minister, he was criticized by some Albanian nationalists for asking Kosovo’s Serbs to help build the new Kosovo.
The effort to build a civic society was initially championed by Ibrahim Rugova, Kosovo’s first president. Mr. Rugova, an ardent secularist, tried to create a national cuisine by serving Kosovar dishes like ice milk and salty cheese. He even tried to rename the Sharr Shepherd, a dog indigenous to Kosovo, as the Kosovo Shepherd. Such was the resistance to his project that when he proposed a new flag in 2000, known as the flag of Dardania — the ancient word for Kosovo — some burned it in protest.
During the cold war, Mr. Kelmendi recalled, Albanians in Kosovo dreamed of reuniting with Albania, which was under a dictatorship and isolated from the rest of Europe. But he said when Kosovar Albanians visited Albania, they saw an impoverished people with whom they had little in common.
“My father had told me about Albania as if it were a fairy tale homeland,” he said, but when he visited, “all I saw was a nightmare.”
Historians are also part of the effort to remold Kosovo. Jahja Dranqolli, a prominent ethnic Albanian historian, said it was time to rewrite Kosovo’s history, which he said had been whitewashed by foreign rulers.
“We were always part of Yugoslavia or Albania or Serbia,” he said. “We have always been living in a shadow world from which we need to escape.”
The ethnic Albanians of Kosovo, who are 95 percent Muslim, could look to their Muslim roots for identity, as some did after the war of the 1990s, when several local imams went to study in Saudi Arabia, and returned preaching Islamic nationalism.
But Shkelzen Maliqi, a leading political analyst and intellectual, argues that Kosovars are far more likely to embrace pro-Americanism. He said that most Albanians were secular, products of a history in which Turks forced mass conversion to Islam upon Christians. The only Islamic party in Kosovo garnered just 2 percent of votes in recent elections. “The national liberation movement against Serbia was always careful to play down Islam and to be pro-Western,” he said.
While the debate about a national identity is taking off, Mr. Kelmendi said it clearly had a long way to go: “When you ask a Kosovar, ‘Are you a Kosovar?’ they will answer, ‘No, I am Albanian.’ If you ask a Serb, ‘Are you a Kosovar?’ they will answer, ‘No, I am a Serb.’”

[Arb]

Kosova's final chapter is still to be written

By Chris Patten
Published: December 17 2007 02:00 | Last updated: December 17 2007 02:00

If the recent wave of commentary on Tony Blair's foreign policy record had to be distilled to a few words, they would be "Kosova good, Iraq bad". For once, the sound-bite is not far from the truth: long before his disastrous venture in the Middle East, Mr Blair did indeed make the right decision to intervene forcefully when Belgrade was ethnically cleansing its southernmost province of its Albanian majority.
What the discussion of the Blair decade generally missed, however, is that the Kosova story is far from over. Today's Pristina may not be like Basra or Baghdad, but its current calm belies the province's underlying instability.
Since 1999, Kosova has been a United Nations protectorate, technically part of Serbia even though Belgrade has no institutions or influence on the ground. With efforts to formalise Kosova's status under discussion at the UN Security Council, the fear is that the longer diplomats delay, the more likely local frustration will turn to bloodshed.
After more than a year of trying to get Belgrade and Pristina to negotiate a settlement on Kosova's final status, the UN special envoy Martti Ahtisaari concluded that neither side was going to change its position on the fundamental issue of status. Belgrade is determined to reassert Serbian sovereignty over Kosova and the Kosovars will never give up their independence demands. A compromise solution is impossible.
So Mr Ahtisaari submitted a comprehensive proposal to the Security Council in March. The council is considering a draft resolution that would endorse Mr Ahtisaari's proposal and open the path towards independence.
That clearly riles the Serbs - as well as their self-declared protector in Moscow, which is threatening a Security Council veto - but the move cannot be a surprise to anyone who has followed events in the region. As a European commissioner, I visited Kosova about 10 times after the 1999 war and it was always obvious that independence was the only sustainable outcome.
First, the historic context that makes Kosova a special case. In 1989, it became the first victim of the aggressive nationalism pursued by Slobodan Milosevic when its far-reaching autonomy within Serbia was abolished.
Kosovars were subject to systematic oppression.
A small Serbian minority - less than 10 per cent - ruled over the majority of Albanian Kosovars.
Moreover, with the dissolution of the Yugoslav federation Kosova lost its status as a federal entity, similar (though not equal) to those of the six Yugoslav republics. After years of the peaceful pursuit of independence, Kosovars turned to armed struggle and in 1999 Mr Milosevic launched a massive military operation, including the ethnic cleansing that sparked the international community's intervention.
Expecting Kosova's 90 per cent Albanian population to be ruled from Belgrade again after all that has occurred would be a recipe for renewed violence. This is why the members of the contact group - France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy, Russia and the US - formally stated more than a year ago that final status must be acceptable to the people of Kosova.
The truth is, there is no viable alternative to the UN special envoy's proposal. Despite their reluctance to get behind the current Security Council draft, even the Russians have not put forward any competing proposal.
Mr Ahtisaari's plan and the draft resolution will probably never please Belgrade, but they do contain strong elements of compromise.
There would be limitations to independent Kosova's sovereignty, such as restrictions on the future defence force and international civilian and military presence that would supervise the early years of independence. For the Serb minority, there are extensive provisions concerning local self-government and the protection of religious heritage, creating conditions that would allow Serbs to remain and for those who have left to return. Nowhere do minorities enjoy such far-reaching rights.
The European Union has a special interest because if Kosova goes wrong, Europe will be first to suffer. Also, the EU has agreed to carry the main burden of backing Kosova both economically and by providing personnel for the military and civilian missions post-independence.
EU members on the Security Council need to push through the resolution with all their diplomatic might. The Kosova story cannot be added to the international community's success column yet. Mr Ahtisaari's final chapter needs to be added.

Lord Patten of Barnes is the former European commissioner for external relations and is chairman of the board of the International Crisis Group

[Arb]

Albanian nation will one way or another unite: Analyzer
23 December 2007, FOCUS News Agency, Sofia

In distant perspective the Albanian nation will one way or another unite, the Chairperson of the International Center for Studying the Minorities and Intercultural interactions Antonina Zhelyazkova commented in an interview for FOCUS News Agency.

According to her sooner or later the independence of Kosovo will be declared – regardless of whether it would be done by the government of Kosovo, or through some kind of agreement within the EU.

[Arb]

Lufta e Serbise me Historine
Beteja e propagandes shkon deri ne te kaluaren e lashte. Serbia zyrtare krenohet me historine e saj heroike dhe te qendreses. Problemi i vetem jane faktet.

Koment nga Christopher Bennett*

Ndersa Serbia sfidon fuqine e Perendimit, shume Serbe krenohen se historia e tyre provon se pavaresisht nga ndryshimi i fuqise se armeve, ata asnje here nuk do te munden. Problemi eshte se versioni i te kaluares qe tregohet ne Beograd nuk qendron. Serbia nuk eshte duke luftuar vetem kunder NATO-s, ajo eshte ne lufte edhe me historine. Pasioni dhe ekspertiza me te cilat kaq shume Serbe flasin kaq shpesh dhe aq gjate rreth vendit te tyre dhe se kaluares se tij heroike permban nje mungese te madhe balance, paanesie dhe kuptimi. Opinionet bazohen pothuajse krejtesisht ne paragjykime dhe parakushte. Qe prej betejes famekeqe te Kosoves ne vitin 1389 deri ne ngjarjet e ketij shekulli, historia dhe mitet jane nderhturur ne nje besim pothuajse fetar nacional. Cdo njeri qe guxon te vere ne dyshim nenet e ketij besimi etiketohet si heretik. Sipas legjendes se Kosoves, udheheqesit Serb, Princi Lazer, i eshte ofruar ne prag te betejes nje mundesi per te zgjedhur midis nje mbreterie ne toke dhe nje ne parajse. Duke u betuar se “Eshte me mire te vdesesh ne beteje se sa te jetosh me turp,” ai zgjodhi boten tjeter, dhe per kete aresye u vra te nesermen, ne ate qe perkujtohet si nje disfate e lavdishme qe i dha fund perandorise Serbe te Mesjetes dhe qe coi ne pothuajse pese shekuj erresire nen zgjedhen e huaj Otomane. Eshte e vertete, qe nje beteje u be ne diten e Shen Vitus ne 1389 ne Fushe Kosove, fusha e zogut te zi, nete cilen Princi Lazar dhe Sulltan Murati, udheheqesi Otoman, u vrane qe te dy. Deri ketu eshte e qarte. Megjithate, pothuajse cdo aspekt tjeter i betejes--perfshire edhe perfundimin e saj--mbetet nje mister. Bazuar ne provat historike, si ushtria Otomane ashtu edhe ajo Serbe ka shume mundesi qe te kene qene forca shumekombeshe. Ne fakt, ka shume mundesi qe pjesa me e madhe e popujve te Krishtere te Ballkanit, perfshire ketu edhe Shqiptaret, te kene kontribuar me trupa per kauzen Serbe dhe se Serbet dhe Shqiptaret te kene luftuar ne te dyja krahet. Per sa i perket rezultatit, duket se beteja nuk ka qene aq e rendesishme dhe decisive sa eshte pershkruar. Rezultati ka qene me teper nje barazim se sa nje fitore e Otomaneve, sepse forcat Turke menjehere pas kesaj beteje u terhoqen nga rajoni. Vete perandoria Serbe ishte shkaterruar qe perpara 30 vjeteve, megjithese pavaresia e shtetit mbeti ne fuqi edhe per 70 vjete te tjere. Mitet historike ne asnje menyre nuk jane vetem ekskluzive te Serbeve, dhe natyrisht, nuk jane domosdoshmerisht te demshme. Ne te vertete, shume shoqeri kane nxjerre forca nga legjendat--pavaresisht ne se ka qene ajo e Arturit apo ajo mbi Washingtonin dhe pemen e qershise--te cilat, ne se shikohen me sy kritik, nuk kane baza historike. Ndryshimi me marreveshjen e Kosoves, eshte qe me ane te saj eshte abuzuar per te rrenjosur nje ndjenje viktimizimi tek Serbet e cila i ka verbuar ata kunder popujve te tjere te Ballkanit. Plani vdekjeprures per Serbine e Madhe ne fund te shekullit te 20te doli nga mendimet dhe shkrimet e Dobrica Cosic, nje prej romanciereve me te njohur ne Serbi dhe nje shkrimtar i epikave historike popullore. Cosic ka qene partizan gjate Luftes se Dyte Boterore dhe nje mik i Titos per me teper se 20 vjet, por megjithate ai nuk mund te binte dakort me perpjekjet e Titos per te emancipuar Shqiptaret e Jugosllavise dhe u likuidua per nacionalizem ne vitin 1968. Gjate periudhes se frustracionit te tij per renien nga maja e piramides, Cosic zhvilloi nje teori komplekse dhe paradoksale te persekucionit kombetar Serb. Pas me shume se dy dekadave, kjo teori evoluoi ne nje program per Serbine e Madhe te cilin Slobodan Miloshevici fillimisht e beri te tijen dhe pastaj e ndoqi. Psikologjia kombetare Serbe e cila ka revoltuar boten qe prej vitit 1991 nuk eshte pra produkti i nje evolucioni historik ne shekuj, por eshte fabrikuar me qellim dhe eshte kultivuar intensivishtnga media Serbe qe prej ardhjes ne pushtet te Miloshevicit, ne vitin 1987. Mit, fantazi, gjysem te verteta dhe genjeshtra te plota jane transmetuar cdo nate neper lajmet e televizionit. Teoria e nje komploti e enderruar nga nacionaliste te frustruar si Cosic ne fund te viteve 1960, 1970 dhe ne fillim te viteve 1980 eshte bere e vertete. Cdo ngjarje e ndodhur ne historine Serbe eshte rritur dhe shtremberuar per te ushqyer kompleksin e persekutimit te njerezve te thjeshte, te cilet ne nje kohe te renies se madhe te standartit te jeteses, gradualisht u pushtuan nga vala e ksenofobise. Atmosfera ishte aq e nxehte dhe fushata aq gjithe perfshirese sa njerezit humben kontaktin me realitetin. Sipas ortodoksise se re, Serbet ishin viktima te shfrytezuar nga dhe ne rrezik prej popujve te tjere te Jugosllavise. Ndersa ata kishin bere sakrifica te panumerta dhe kishin derdhur gjak per te krijuar Jugosllavine dhe kishin qene fitues neper luftera, ata ishin gjoja mashtruar ne kohe paqe dhe shperndare neper disa republika ne kohen e shtetit te decentralizuar te Titos. Si cdo teori tjeter komploti, ka edhe ketu nje grimce te vertete ne ortodoksine e re Serbe. Por eshte nje grimce teper e vogel. Po te shikohen per shembull, marredheniet ndermjet Serbeve dhe Kroateve. Ndersa propagandistet e sotem (ne te dyja krahet) thone se keta popuj kane luftuar me njeri tjetrin qe prej shume kohesh, rivaliteti Serbo-Kroat eshte ne fakt nje fenomen i shekullit te 20te. Ne shekullin e 19te, nacionalistet Kroate, te cilet ishin te zene duke luftuar ndaj Austriakeve dhe Hungarezeve, kane qene ne fakt admirues te medhenj te Serbise dhe perkrahesit me te medhenj te nje shteti Jugosllav. Dhe partia ne fuqi ne parlamentin Kroat te vitit 1914 e cila votoi per te nisur luften me Serbine ishte Koalicioni Serbo-Kroat. Me pas vjen Lufta e Dyte Boterore. Per Serbet, ky konflikt eshte prova me e madhe qe ata kane pothuaj nje monopol te vuajtjeve dhe si rrjedhim nuk mund te bejne asgje te keqe. Ne fund te fundit, ata do te thone se luftuan perkrah aleateve kunder Nazisteve dhe pesuan shume humbje ne njerez. Por a eshte me te vertete kjo nje pamje e asaj qe ka ndodhur? Ne nje shkalle te madhe Lufta e Dyte Boterore ne Jugosllavi ka qene nje perzierje e disa lufterave civile te cilat kane pasur pak te bejne me luften boterore qe luftohej jashte vendit. Te gjitha grupet, me perjashtim te Slloveneve, kane luftuar kunder Serbeve, megjithese jo te gjithe ne unison, ndersa nacionalistet ekstreme ne te gjitha krahet kane pasur mundesi te nxisin fantazite e tyre me te cmendura. Pjesa kryesore e ushtrise partizane te Titos ne fillim perbehej kryesisht nga Serbe te cilet largoheshin krimet e Ustasheve ne Kroaci dhe Bosnje, por jo nga Serbe prej brenda Serbise. Pervec se nje kryengritje te shpejte ne vitin 1941, e cila u shtyp egersisht, Serbia mbeti pak a shume e qete deri prane fundit te luftes. Hitleri vendosi nje udheheqes Kuisling, Gjeneralin Milan Nedic, i cili ishte besnik ndaj Nazisteve. Ne mungese te luftimeve, Nedic qe ne gjendje te spastronte komunitetin Hebre te Serbise nen mbikqyrjen e Gjermaneve, ne menyre me efikase se sa Ustashet komunitetin Hebre te Kroacise dhe Bosnjes. Megjithate, propagandistet Serbe ne vitet 1990 nuk hezituan te flisnin per nje ndjenje te vecante afersi midis Serbeve dhe Hebrenjve. Edhe ceshtja e te vrareve gjate luftes eshte shtremberuar shume. Numri zyrtar i Jugosllaveve te cilet kane vdekur ne luftime ndaj fuqive te Aksit ishte 1.7 milion. Shifra ishte vetem nje numer i perafert i kalkuluar menjehere pas luftes per qellime te demshperblimeve dhe ato propagandistike. Tito synonte qe nga njera ane te merrte sa me teper kompensime nga Gjermania dhe nga ana tjeter ti tregonte botes shkallen e heroizmit dhe vuajtjeve te Jugosllavise. Por ne qarqet nacionaliste Serbe, te cilat veprojne ne baze te principit “ sa me shume aq me mire”, shifrat e serbeve te vdekur zmadhohen deri ne nivele absurde--ngadonjehere deri ne 700,000 vetem ne kampin famekeqe te perqendrimit ne Jasenovac. Gjate viteve 1980, kerkime te pavavrura mbi kete ceshtje nga dy njerez Bogoljub Kocovic, nje serb i emigruar dhe Vladimir Zerjavic, nje kroat, kane dhene rezultate shume te ngjashme. Te dy kerkuesit nuk jane bazuar mbi numerime te trupave apo mbledhje te kujtimeve te te mbijetuarve por mbi analiza kompiuterike te regjistrimit te popullsise dhe indekseve demografike. Sipas Kocovic, shifrat e te cilit jane pak me te larta se ato te Zerjavic, rreth 1,014,000 ose 6.4% e popullsise se Jugosllavise se vitit 1941, kane vdekur gjate ose menjehere pas Luftes se Dyte Boterore nga te gjitha krahet. Sipas rezultateve te tyre, ne shifra absolute, serbet kane pasur humbjet me te medha, me 487,000 te vdeku. Shifrat jane tronditese--dhe vetem numrat nuk mund te japin ne menyre adeguate tmerret e kryera. Por per fat te mire ato jane shume me te uleta se shifrat zyrtare, dhe natyrisht me te uleta se ato te ekstremisteve nacionaliste. Kontributi i Jugosllavise ne radhet e Aleateve eshte gjithashtu ekzagjeruar shume, se pari nga vete fituesit dhe me vone edhe nga zyrtare shteterore te cilet deshironin te justifikonin politiken e mosnderhyrjes ne konfliktin e tanishem. Per shkak te kaosit te shkaktuar nga lufterat civile brenda Jugosllavise, Gjermania asnjehere nuk ka pasur nevoje te vendose nje numer te madh trupash atje.

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Te vetmet here qe Gjermania ka pasur nje numer te madh trupash ne Jugosllavi ka qene gjate pushtimit 12 ditor me 1941 dhe me 1944 kur trupat e vendosur ne Greqi u terhoqen nepermjet Jugosllavise. Perndryshe, Gjermania eshte mbeshtetur ne aleatet e saj, Italianet, Hungarezet dhe Bullgaret, si edhe tek bashkepunetoret vendas per te mbajtur nen kontroll Jugosllavine. Luftimet me te ashpra jane kryer kryesisht ne Bosnje. Pavaresisht se c’fare aspekti te historise Serbe studion, versioni zyrtar i dale nga Beogradi duket se bie ne kundershtim me faktet. Ajo qe eshte vecanerisht e trishtueshme, eshte qe deri pak kohe me pare, perpara daljes ne skene te Miloshevicit , Serbia ka qene republika me liberale dhe progresive ne Jugosllavi. Mediat serbe ishin vecanerisht te hapura ne baze te standarteve te Europes Lindore dhe opozita politika ishte e tolerueshme madje edhe inkurajohej. Duke pare prapa ne historine serbe eshte e mundshme te interpretosh shume ngjarje ne menyra te ndryshme madje edhe te gjesh periudha te bashkepunimit midis serbeve dhe joserbeve. Pavaresisht nga rezultatet e fushates se NATO-s e ardhmja e Serbise mund te varet ne nje pjese te madhe nga lufta me historine e saj.

*Christopher Bennett eshte ish drejtor i Grupit Nderkombetar te Krizave ne Ballkan dhe autor i librit Shkaterrimi i Pergjakshem i Jugosllavise

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Serbia at a crossroads as loss of Kosova looms






By Ellie Tzortzi - Analysis
BELGRADE (Reuters) - When Serbia's leaders appeal to the United Nations on Wednesday to block independence for its breakaway Kosovo province, it will be a plea based on history, emotion and the bitterness of 15 years of defeats.
It will also be a reminder to the West that although nationalist Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic is dead, the hardline defiance and victim complex he exploited in his people is still part of the national psyche.

"Most Serbs have never visited Kosovo and don't want to go to Kosovo, but they see it as part of their founding legend," said James Lyon, senior Balkans adviser of the International Crisis Group think-tank.

Serbs are brought up on poems of the medieval kingdom, defeated by the Ottomans in the epic Kosovo battle of 1389. The national myths are tied to the symbolism of a land that is home to the Serbian Orthodox church and hundreds of monasteries.

"Even for Serbs who are not religious, Kosovo is a defining point," Lyon said. "Once you bring up Kosovo, rationality goes out the window. Serbs are so sold on this legend and myth, they don't know what the reality is."

The U.N. Security Council meets on Wednesday to discuss Kosovo's future after negotiations failed to secure agreement. The Kosovo Albanians have said they plan to declare independence within months, despite Serbia's fierce opposition.

Multi-ethnic as far back as the Middle Ages and contested by warring neighbors, Kosovo had a mostly Albanian population by the early 1900s. In Josip Broz Tito's socialist Yugoslavia after World War Two, it had a high degree of autonomy and relative social and ethnic peace.

Milosevic's rise to power -- heralded by a bellicose speech he delivered in Kosovo in 1989 -- rolled back many of the rights of the 90-percent Albanian majority.

When a guerrilla war against Serb forces began in 1998, the crackdown was brutal. About 10,000 civilians were killed, mostly Albanians, and 1 million were expelled for months.

WESTERN INTERVENTION
NATO bombed Serbia for 78 days in 1999 until Milosevic withdrew troops. The U.N. took over Kosovo, keeping a lid on Albanian independence dreams.

Croatia and Bosnia fought free of Serb-dominated Yugoslavia to internationally recognized independence but Serbia kept a fig leaf of sovereignty over Kosovo through U.N. resolution 1244.

Serbs were never told they had been defeated, said Srdjan Bogosavljevic, analyst at Strategic Marketing polling agency.
"Generals were given medals and Milosevic presented it as a big victory," he said. "All those in power since have stuck to that line, never spelling out that Serbia lost the war. This denial will last as long as the political elite insists on it."

Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica is at the vanguard of the new battle for Kosovo. Once hailed by the West as a moderate, he now epitomizes the hardline challenge to the West.

"For us, Kosovo independence does not exist and cannot be," he told Russian television last week. If the West recognizes Kosovo it would be to create "a puppet state", but Serbia was relying on Russia to block U.N. recognition forever, he said.
Tim Judah, an author and commentator on the Balkans, said Serbs would feel they would be losing yet another war, although many mistrusted their politicians and knew Kosovo was lost.

"There is a feeling that we are at the end, that the destruction of Yugoslavia started in Kosovo and will end in Kosovo," Judah said. "But Kosovo has another resonance, it's more important historically and spiritually."

MAXIMUM AUTONOMY
Serbia has offered the Albanians "maximum autonomy", all the trappings of statehood without the borders, army and U.N. seat.

A plan to give Kosovo independence under European Union supervision was blocked by Russia but a majority of EU member states plan to implement it anyway.

Some 70 percent of Serbs want Serbia to join the wealthy EU, government polls say. But 75 percent would reject membership if it were conditioned on Serbia recognizing an independent Kosovo.

Kosovo is expected to declare independence in the first few months of 2008. Analysts expect protests, hardline rhetoric and maybe a resurgence of nationalism or a symbolic tilt to Russia.

"The 'Greater Serbia' idea feeds on crisis," said Andjelko Milardovic of the Zagreb-based Centre for Political Studies. "It would take a transformation of Serbian society, and improvement of social and economic conditions, for it to lose its appeal."

The EU has offered Serbia a fast track to membership to help overcome the loss of Kosovo, once it arrests the last four Serbs wanted by the Hague war crimes tribunal.
No matter what the West does, Serbia's destiny is in the hands of rival leaders Kostunica and President Boris Tadic. Tadic, seen as a pro-Western moderate, faces ultra-nationalist Tomislav Nikolic in a presidential election next month.

"There is an ideological conflict going on right now," Judah said. "How that conflict is resolved in the next weeks and months will determine Serbia's future in the next 10 years."
(Editing by Timothy Heritage)

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Kosova Catholics call for independence

The head of the Catholic Church in Kosovo has added his voice to calls for independence. In the wake of inconclusive talks at the UN Security Council over the province's political future, the stage is set for the majority Albanian community to go ahead with its proposed declaration of independence from Serbia.

Bishop Gjergji said the people of Kosovo deserve independence as do other democratic nations.

These sentiments were echoed on the streets of Pristina, where many people, regardless of their religion (most in Kosovo are at least nominally Muslim), are wishing for independence next year.

"Apart from the goodness of people I want an independent Kosovo," one man said.

"My wish is for an independent Kosovo, as well as goodwill among people to help others, especially children lost without their parents." said one woman.

EuroNews

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The Balkans in 2008

20 December 2007 Grim warnings about Kosovo’s future after its expected independence may have overstated the troubles ahead, but they have also blinded many to a host of other problems Serbia and the rest of the region will have to face. By Tim Judah in London
The Kosovo deadline of December 10th at the United Nations came and went. At the same time large numbers of foreign journalists descended on the region. Their predictions were dire. The region faced a new war concluded many.

But I would argue that while they have ignored the region since 1999, it has changed, although that is not such a sexy story is it? Here are my predictions for 2008.

Barring the unexpected, we know that the key event for the region in the next few months will be Kosovo’s declaration of independence and its recognition as an independent state by the vast majority of EU countries, the US, most Muslim states and many more.

The key questions for the rest of the region concern the fallout from this and how it is managed.

The first group of issues relate to the situation on the ground. In the north of Kosovo we will see a new frozen conflict as this Serbian-dominated region continues to live as a de facto part of Serbia. Several questions will follow. Who will control the border points from the north to Serbia? Will the vital water pipeline from Gazivoda to the rest of Kosovo, which serves the vital, albeit aging power plant at Obilic, be turned off?

The second group of issues concern the Serbian enclaves. Will they continue to operate as Serbian islands surrounded by an Albanian sea? Security is an oft-cited issue but I suspect it will be less so, than is often imagined.

Less talked about is the question of money. Many people in the enclaves (but numbers are uncertain,) survive thanks to double salaries paid from Serbia to civil servants, many of them in basically fictitious jobs. In other words they are paid to stay in Kosovo.

If these people are safe and continue to receive these salaries they will stay, for now. If not they will have to leave sooner rather than later.

Serbia has implied it will place an economic blockade on Kosovo, or rather its Albanian parts. This will probably not be sustainable. Serbia exports €150-200m a year to Kosovo but Kosovo exports nothing to Serbia. Sanctions busting will boom via Montenegro and Macedonia and all the local mafias will do well from this. The Serbian enclaves will suffer especially, as prices will soar. Albanians will be able to source many imports, e.g., construction materials, from elsewhere.

A blockade will give a major impetus to Albania to accelerate the ongoing construction of the highway from Kosovo to the port of Durres.

Independence for the Albanian parts of Kosovo will soon provoke soul searching amongst Albanians as living standards fail to improve simply because the country is independent. However a blockade from Serbia will give politicians an excuse to blame Serbia for this and they will rely heavily on help and direction from the incoming EU mission in Kosovo and the so-called International Civilian Office.

Serbia’s future for the next decade depends on how it will react to the formalisation of its loss of most of Kosovo. Dusan Pavlovic of the Belgrade Faculty of Political Science could not have put the issue more succinctly than he did in a piece for the daily Politika on December 19: “The most important political issue in 2008 will be whether the country should be moving towards the European Union or keep up its struggle for Kosovo as an inalienable part of Serbia, even at the price of suspending European integration.”

Key questions here are the following. If EU states decide to shelve their demand that General Ratko Mladic, wanted for genocide by the UN war crimes tribunal in The Hague be arrested – which seems possible – then Serbia will be invited to sign a Stabilisation and Association Agreement, SAA, next month. An SAA is widely regarded as the first formal step on the road to eventual EU accession.

Serbia might decide however, as Vojislav Kostunica, its prime minister has hinted, that it will not to sign, regarding this as an insulting attempt to compensate Serbia for Kosovo.

At its simplest, and whatever they say in public, leaders of President Boris Tadic’s pro-Western Democratic Party believe that Serbia has no choice but to pursue European integration. Kostunica’s conservative party, with whom they are in coalition, is by contrast officially aligned with Vladimir Putin’s United Russia party.

The third player in this Serbian ménage à trois is the Radical Party, whose founder Vojislav Seselj is currently on trial for war crimes in The Hague. Tomislav Nikolic, the party’s acting leader in Serbia, stands a fair chance of winning the presidential elections in January with a run-off in February.

The key related question is whether, under the strain of the Kosovo issue, the current government collapses and Kostunica enters a coalition with the Radicals.

The effects of a Radical as president and/or the Radicals in government would not necessarily be seen immediately. On December 18 Mladjan Dinkic, Serbia’s Minister of Economy, said he expected $6 billion worth of foreign direct investment in 2008. This would undoubtedly suffer as potential investors would most likely lose interest in a country whose EU accession process would now slow considerably, if not grind to a halt.

Ironically, if Serbia took the position that continuing to fight for Kosovo was more important than European integration, this could have beneficial fallout for Serbia’s neighbours. The EU would more than likely step up help to Bosnia, Montenegro and Macedonia to accelerate their accessions and thus to try and inoculate them from potential instability emanating from Serbia.

The same would be the case with NATO, and in these circumstances it would be hard for Greece to justify its threatened veto for a Macedonian invitation to join at its Bucharest summit in April, where Albania and Croatia are also expected to receive invitations.

The recent political breakthrough in Bosnia also heralds an important signal. That is to say while the leadership of the Republika Srpska, RS, the Serb part of Bosnia, is happy to use the Kosovo issue and Serbian backing to defend its rights under the Dayton peace accords of 1995, it is also keen to look after its own interests, and these may increasingly diverge from those of Serbia.

The interests of the RS leadership are simply to remain in full control of their largely-autonomous republic. Clearly they want to prevent power draining to Bosnia’s central authorities in Sarajevo. But while happy when there is a coincidence of interests with Belgrade that does not mean that they want to be told what to do by Serbia either.

If Serbia turns away from the path of EU integration then we can expect its influence in the RS to wane.

Bulgaria took 14 years to join the EU from signing an initial agreement. If Serbia and Bosnia proceed at the same speed, if the clock starts in 2008, then they would only accede in 2022. Both could proceed faster, if the political will is there. If not, isolation beckons.

Finally, with regard to the even longer term futures of the former Yugoslav states, and in this regard Kosovo is an exception, action needs to be taken over the looming demographic and pensions crisis.

Just take Serbia alone. Despite the influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees since 1991 it is losing 25,000 to 30,000 people a year or 0.3% of the population. According to Bozidar Djelic, Serbia’s deputy premier, “it is the fourth oldest nation in the world, with an average age of 40.2.” Although since the fall of Milosevic in 2000, he says the birth-rate has risen slightly, Serbia; “is still at the bottom of the list of European countries with less than one child per marriage,” far less than the 2.1 required to keep the population at its current level.

The next year will tell whether Kosovo remains the key issue for the region for the next few years or whether politicians such as Djelic can advance work on their political portfolios, in his case European integration, and begin to deal with other issues, such as declining and aging populations.

Tim Judah, a leading Balkan commentator, is the author of The Serbs: History, Myth and the Destruction of Yugoslavia; and Kosovo: War and Revenge. Balkan Insight is BIRN's online publication.